Even in an election year, Obama's support for these international arrangements-where regulators in different countries agreed to embrace common standards-was not a strictly partisan issue. As Obama spoke, President George W. Bush coordinated a wide array of market support programs across the G20 countries. 6 "I'm a market-oriented guy," he would later comment, "but not when I'm faced with the prospect of a global meltdown." 7 Bush appointees followed similar maxims. Just two years earlier, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke (whom Bush appointed) had negotiated and advocated strongly for domestic implementation of the Basel II capital accords, saying that "international cooperation and consistency" on large-bank regulation "remains very much in the interest of the United States." 8 Skeptics of international financial regulation also resided on both sides of the aisle. Tarullo, one of Obama's campaign advisors 10 and President Clinton's assistant for international economic policy, 11 wrote that the "tortured negotiations" over Basel II had kept U.S. regulators from addressing the very risks that torpedoed Bear Stearns. 12 Without discounting cooperation entirely, he wrote, "something different must be tried." 13 Surprisingly, Obama's victory that fall ushered in victories for both believers and skeptics of international regulatory coordination. After the crisis, as a member of the Basel Committee 14 and Financial Action Task Force, 15 the United States engaged actively in the creation of new international standards 16 At that time, the Basel Committee put in place a rigorous process to review the standard and its implications for financial markets, credit extension and economic growth.").
risk management, 19 governance, 20 and the prevention of money laundering and the financing of terrorism. 21 However, federal policymakers also began to express new skepticism towards the work of foreign financial regulators. Beginning with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank"), 22 they ratified policies that exposed the U.S. affiliates of foreign banks to stricter treatment on American shores. These trends were not restricted to certain branches of government, nor to certain areas of financial regulation, but coexisted across U.S. policy, even within the same piece of legislation.
This Comment attempts to explain how America could, ostensibly, both jealously guard and willingly cede control over the rules that governed its financial system. America's renewed commitment to international engagement was consistent with rational institutionalism, particularly with Robert Keohane's "demand-side" account of international regimes. 23 Keohane argued that the "anarchy" and "pervasive uncertainty" of a world without global government create transaction costs, which prevent nations from engaging in coordinated, "mutually beneficial" behavior. 24 International institutions lower those transaction costs-for example, by creating legal commitments (and with them, liability) or easing the acquisition of information; institutions allow nations to make 19 See, e.g., BASEL COMM. ON However, the demand-side account provides a less satisfying explanation of America's post-crisis domestic financial regulations. Though they generally create no binding international legal obligations, regulatory fora like the Basel Committee are premised on mutual trust; participating countries agree to implement policy on the condition that their peers do so as well. 27 However, Dodd-Frank's heightened prudential standards, 28 restrictions on IMF support, 29 and novel supervisory authority over foreign nonbanks 30 were not contingent measures; they applied even if a foreign country's bank supervisor lived up to international norms. In short, the United States was not simply a unified rational actor "hedging its bets" on the international stage using domestic policy; the country's actions seemed to both preclude and assume the possibility its allies would defect and "under-regulate" their financial institutions.
To explain this concurrence of cooperation and defection, one must instead look to domestic politics-not just electoral, but also institutional and individual. Public attention to the details of regulatory reform was scant, especially as Congress considered other 25 Id. at 334. 26 although Congress urged the Federal Reserve to give "due regard to the principle of national treatment and equality of competitive opportunity" in foreign-bank rulemakings 34 -some have argued that the rule imposes a subsidiarization requirement on foreign-owned U.S. banks. 35 The Author take no position on this interpretation, and it falls outside the time period and thus the scope of this Comment; however, the possibility of it emerged much earlier, and its spirit animated the final text of the bill.
BACKGROUND: U.S. DOMESTIC REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKING ORGANIZATIONS
To operate in the United States, commercial banking organizations must meet two broad requirements, regardless of the nationality of their ultimate parent: First, they must secure and maintain a charter; second, they must abide by the laws and regulations to which their charter subjects them. 36 Over time, these requirements have shaped both commercial opportunities for foreign financial institutions in the United States and foreign access to the U.S. financial system. 37 Under the U.S. "dual banking system," banks may opt to apply for either a state or federal charter. 38 Federally chartered banking organizations are subject to regulations by at least one federal prudential regulator. "National banks," for example, are regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") 39 ; "bank holding companies," "financial holding companies," and Edge Act corporations are regulated by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve ("Federal Reserve") and examined by regional banks of the Federal Reserve System. 40 Federally chartered banking organizations must also obtain federal deposit insurance and follow the regulations of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"). 41 By contrast, state-chartered banking organizations are regulated by state banking authorities. However, most states require their banks to obtain federal deposit insurance, 42 and state-chartered banks may join the Federal Reserve System. 43 As a result, many state-chartered banks are also subject to FDIC and Federal Reserve oversight. 44 Foreign banks have long operated in the United States through a mix of distinct entity forms, each of which faces different limitations on its funding and operations. 45 Branch offices of U.S. banks can accept deposits and make loans on behalf of a foreign bank; branches do not need to raise separate capital from their parent bank by issuing equity or debt or meet separate capital requirements, such as holding a certain proportion of equity to other instruments. 46 By contrast, foreign bank subsidiaries must be separately capitalized. 47 Bankers sometimes argue that such capital requirements are "expensive," while regulators sometimes argue that the requirements improve investor oversight and make institutions more resilient, reducing the expected costs. 48 Until 1978, foreign banking organizations and U.S. banks owned by a foreign financial institution were ineligible for federal charters or federal deposit insurance. A foreign bank that wished to operate in the United States had to obtain a state charter, and states regulated much of their activity. 49 However, in the wake of the 1974 failures of Herstatt and Franklin National Bank, Congress passed the International Banking Act ("IBA"), which subjected foreign bank branches to the same Federal Reserve regulations and supervision as U.S. bank holding companies. 50 Under the "source of strength" doctrine, which the Federal Reserve successfully applied under the Bank Holding Company Act, foreign banks were effectively required to support-with both financial and managerial resources-the operations of their U.S. branches. 51 The IBA also established the principle of "national 45 treatment and equality of competitive opportunity," allowing foreign banks to obtain national charters from the OCC and deposit insurance from the FDIC. 52 Foreign banks faced more stringent federal regulations after a wave of late-1980s financial panics, including a scandal involving the Bank of Commerce Credit International ("BCCI") and Banca Nazionale de Lavoro. 53 Passed in 1991, the Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act ("FBSEA") required the Federal Reserve to approve any new foreign bank branches and decide whether a foreign bank's home country subjected its parent to "comprehensive consolidated supervision." 54 For the first time, federal regulators had to assess the conduct of regulatory agencies in foreign countries, before letting a company from that foreign country operate in the United States. Federal regulators have entered into "information-sharing memoranda of understanding" with foreign regulatory agencies, including those in Dubai 55 and the U.K., 56 The FBSEA also required the Treasury Department to study the idea of only allowing foreign banks to operate in the United States through subsidiaries (holding their own capital) instead of branches (without holding their own capital). However, Treasury rejected this idea, worrying that "foreign countries might also retaliate against U.S. bank branches, perhaps by requiring that they establish a subsidiary or by otherwise restricting their activities." 58 Instead, over this same thirty year period, the United States participated in the creation of standards for banking oversight through the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision ("Basel Committee"), a convening of G10 central bankers and bank regulators that began in 1974. 59 The Committee began by issuing a non-binding accord on the definition and appropriate levels of bank capital, then crafted increasingly complex standards on cross-border regulation, the use of private banking risk models, and risk management. 60 revealed two substantial problems that were specific to foreign banks operating in the United States, which Basel II did not address.
The first problem involved Lehman Brothers and demonstrated the risk of relying on capital held overseas for the stability of U.S. banking operations. The 158-year-old investment bank teetered on the brink of collapse in September 2008, when Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, New York Federal Reserve President Timothy Geithner, and Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") Chairman Christopher Cox brokered a tentative acquisition by the U.K.-based bank Barclays plc. 63 However, with commitments from both Lehman and Barclays in place, Barclays' regulator, the U.K. Financial Services Agency (FSA), refused to approve the deal without notice to Barclays' shareholders or greater assurances about Lehman's solvency. 64 Shareholder notice alone would require a long enough delay to virtually guarantee Lehman's collapse. After a call with U.K. FSA Chairman Callum McCarthy, Treasury Secretary Paulson ruefully told a room full of CEOs of large banks who had agreed to support the deal, "[the British] grin-f***ed us." One CEO retorted: "Isn't this our closest ally in the world?" 65 The second problem was the byproduct of a successful U.S. strategy to stanch financial panic. One of the largest risks to the U.S. financial system came from American International Group ("AIG"), a multi-line insurance company that underwrote credit-default swaps ("CDS"), which guaranteed large private financial institutions against losses on mortgage-backed securities. 66 As those losses began to mount, AIG itself began to falter, and the possibility of its failure to pay amounts due on those swaps imperiled the solvency of major U.S. financial institutions. 67 To avoid catastrophe, the U.S. government offered AIG an $85 billion loan facility in exchange for a controlling stake in the company. 68 However, AIG's exposures were global, not just domestic, meaning that support from U.S. taxpayers helped AIG honor its obligations to foreign financial institutions. 69 Supporting AIG-and its overseas counterparties-came at a steep political cost. Federal Reserve skeptics claimed that the government had used trillions in taxpayer funds to support foreigners, 70 a claim that appeared more egregious when AIG and other recipients of federal support paid out hundreds of millions of dollars in bonuses. 71 Worse still, press outlets often reported the Federal Reserve's gross extensions as if they were net figures, making the support offered by U.S. taxpayers seem even larger. 72 To critics, foreign banks had not been a source of strength to the United States; rather, the United States had been a source of strength to foreign banks. 68 
UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL POST-CRISIS FINANCIAL REGULATORY MEASURES
Despite this early backlash, much of the initial United States response to the financial crisis was multilateral and international. By August 2009, the Federal Reserve had extended temporary bilateral credit lines to fourteen other central banks, in order to maintain liquidity in foreign currency markets. 73 In September 2009, a meeting of G20 leaders produced a list of specific commitments each country would make to advance financial reform. 74 To enforce these commitments, the G20 converted the Financial Stability Forum into the Financial Stability Board ("FSB"), a clearinghouse to oversee the largest global financial institutions and exchange information on system-wide financial risks. 75 The FSB began to monitor compliance with Basel Committee standards, and starting in 2010, the Basel Committee itself began to publish revised standards for bank oversight. 76 The United States also redoubled its commitment to the Financial Action Task Force ("FATF"), a group of thirty-five states and international organizations established in 1989 to coordinate antimoney laundering and counter-the-financing-of-terrorism (AML/CFT) policy. 77 FATF issued a more stringent set of non-binding "recommendations" in 2012 and facilitated a set of peer reviews 73 between its members' finance ministries. 78 Finally, even in its own domestic activities, the United States showed deference to foreign regulators-for example, limiting its initial stress-testing program to U.S. companies, even though two of the ten largest financial institutions in the United States were owned by foreign banks. 79 These initial international steps had several traits in common. First, as with previous Basel capital accords, they gained the wholehearted support of the G20, but they remained formally nonbinding. Second, enforcement mechanisms were limited to reputational costs; the FSB and FATF would "name and shame" countries that failed to honor their commitments, but they could impose no other formal sanctions.
Third, senior officials in the executive branch retained almost complete discretion over U.S. consent to these measures. The Undersecretary of the Treasury for International Finance held responsibility for representing the United States in G7 and G20 discussions under many of its recent officeholders, including John Taylor, 80 85 Beyond overseeing and confirming the leaders of these agencies-and, in the case of the U.S. Treasury, appropriating its operating funds-the roles of Congress and the courts remained relatively limited. 86 Leaders of the U.S. executive branch were not shy about their support for increased international cooperation. In closing the G20 Pittsburgh Summit, President Obama said that since "the nations of the world share mutual interests," the G20 countries must inaugurate "a new era of engagement . . . and act on behalf of our shared security and prosperity." 87 Bernanke, who remained Federal Reserve Chairman under Obama, agreed with this sentiment publicly, calling it "self-evident that, in light of the global nature of financial institutions and markets, the reform of financial regulation and supervision should be coordinated internationally to the greatest extent possible." 88 Geithner did the same, telling an IMF audience that its response to the crisis must be "quick, forceful, and global in nature." 89 In their respective memoirs, Geithner and Bernanke also supported internationalism-in order to preserve U.S. competitiveness. "Without international coordination," Bernanke wrote:
tougher domestic regulation might result only in banking activity moving out of the United States to foreign financial centers. Moreover, even if foreign jurisdictions adopted comparably tough rules, in the absence of international coordination those rules might be inconsistent with U.S. standards, which could fragment global capital markets and otherwise diminish the effectiveness of new rules. 90 Geithner struck a similar note in 2014: "If we had unilaterally imposed strict new limits on risk, without encouraging higher standards globally, we simply would have reduced the market share of U.S. firms around the world, without making the global system more resilient." 91 The close alignment of these two perspectives-one at the helm of the Federal Reserve, the other at the Treasury-was not lost on Members of Congress at the time. 92 There was, however, a notable skeptic in the executive branch, who was heavily involved in U.S. activities at Basel and the FSB: Daniel Tarullo, then at the Federal Reserve, who quickly emerged as the institution's de facto leader on financial regulation. 93 Tarullo's public statements at the time were circumspect, saying that "satisfyingly clean and comprehensive solutions" to international financial regulation were "not within sight." 94 Some, however, were more pointed, as when he used apophasis to reference the U.K.'s actions on Lehman Brothers: "Some have called into question the traditional assumption that home country authorities will be willing and able to support all of the worldwide operations of a banking group headquartered in its jurisdiction." 95 Tarullo's academic writings were still more direct. In his 2008 book, Banking on Basel, Tarullo argued that "none of [the] potential advantages" of the Basel Committee's recent work were "both substantial and likely to be realized"; instead, Basel should focus on improving domestic authorities' oversight of their own banks. 96 As a potent voice in the . 95 Id. 96 TARULLO, supra note 12, at 10-11; see also Tarullo Biography, supra note 11, at 190 ("There is an undeniable attraction to a conceptually elegant mode of regulation that calibrates bank capital precisely to the risks associated with whatever credit exposures a bank may assume, whatever instruments it may trade, and whatever operations it may conduct. This attraction has perhaps come dangerously close to being a Siren song for at least some Basel II authors and defenders. One hopes that the subprime crisis has, if nothing else, injected sufficiently dissonant notes to catch the attention of Basel II believers").
Federal Reserve and at Basel, Tarullo was well-positioned to turn his skepticism into U.S. policy.
COOPERATION MEETS DEFECTION:
THE DRAFTING OF DODD-FRANK
The initial Obama Administration proposals for financial reform legislation reflected this mix of views within the executive branch: They placed a high premium on international cooperation, and they limited the ability of more skeptical, structurally insulated bureaucratic actors, such as the Federal Reserve, to diminish that cooperation.
The White House's first salvo in the reform debate was a 2009 white paper, dividing the administration's ideas for changing financial oversight into five separate objectives. 97 The paper proposed that regulators give more attention to foreign financial firms, but only if those firms' "U.S. was through the Financial Stability Oversight Council, which the Treasury Secretary would chair and which could "recommend" firms for oversight. 101 However, a separate section mitigated the Federal Reserve's ability to exercise this authority, requiring it and the Treasury to "consult with their foreign counterparties and through appropriate multilateral organizations to reach agreement to extend comprehensive and robust prudential supervision and regulation to all highly leveraged and substantially interconnected financial companies." 102 Here, the Federal Reserve gained somewhat greater leeway, but its constraints took the form of legislative obligations, not bureaucratic ones from the Treasury.
However, Members of Congress-from both parties-met the international elements of the Administration's proposals with substantially more skepticism. Some, like Representative Ron Paul (R-TX), railed against the Federal Reserve and its general lack of transparency, demanding to know "what we are doing when we are talking to foreign central banks, foreign governments, international organizations." 103 Others expressed concern that by relying on international cooperation, U.S. taxpayers would again have to subsidize the poor decisions of foreign banks. Representative Carolyn McCarthy (D-NY), citing AIG, said that "a significant amount, billions and billions, tens of billions of dollars, went to foreign banks. . . . I do not believe we should be bailing out foreign banks. I believe other governments should bail out their own banks." 104 principal subsidiaries of international holding companies." 110 Geithner vigorously defended the need for a "level playing field that can be enforced more evenly, and so that risk can't just migrate to where it is going to face less strict supervision and oversight." 111 Others, however, were more aligned with Tarullo and Congressional skeptics. FDIC Chair Sheila Bair invoked the Foreign Bank Supervision Act in her testimony, to suggest that the United States require foreign banks to operate only in separately capitalized subsidiaries. 112 Congress's own reform legislation reflected the legislature's hesitancy about the regulation of foreign banks, giving more authority to domestic regulators and placing less emphasis on international fora. The initial bills drafted by Representative Barney Frank (D-MA) and Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT) merely left the detailed questions of foreign bank oversight almost entirely to the Federal Reserve. 113 However, some proposed amendments were much harder on foreign banks-such as a pre-ratification draft of H.R. 4173, which gave the SEC and Federal Reserve the power to deny or revoke the charter of a bank whose home country "has not adopted, or made demonstrable progress toward adopting, an appropriate system of financial regulation to mitigate such systemic risk." 114 6. BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND LOW-PUBLIC-SALIENCY REFORM Despite the early backlash over "foreign bailouts," it is unlikely that the split outcome was the result of popular political pressure. Financial reform legislation took shape in the middle of the conservative "tea party wave," which reclaimed control of Congress in November 2010 and advocated total opposition to any measure that President Obama favored. 121 Popular support for financial reform was divided along party lines, with Democrats favoring increased bank regulation by fifty-three points and Republicans opposing it by forty-eight. 122 However, financial reform was neither the most salient nor the most polarizing issue that Congress was debating at the time. A contentious climate change bill, 123 a $3.5 trillion federal budget, 124 and comprehensive national healthcare reform were also on the legislative agenda. 125 Though polling on the issue saliency of On the surface, then, popular domestic politics might seem to have no real place in international financial regulatory accords. However, the Dodd-Frank Act suggests that this appearance is false. International financial regulation is not exempt from domestic politics, but the politics that shape it are distinct from those that shape less technical, more popularly salient issues. United States foreign policy around financial services takes many different forms-from FATF peer reviews and high-level G20 commitments, to domestic regulations that align with Basel Committee standards or enforce the source-of-strength doctrine, to federal legislation like DoddFrank with seemingly little extraterritorial effect. Each of these mechanisms constitutes a different aspect of America's interaction with the world on financial regulation-and the people and institutions responsible for each mechanism are different, as are their individual preferences and institutional incentives. Wherever these preferences and incentives are not perfectly aligned, politics occurs-even in the absence of public attention.
These politics-which are bureaucratic, rather than electoralmatter greatly to international policy outcomes. From 2008-2010, the U.S. President, his finance minister, and the head of his central bank consistently expressed their belief that multilateral solutions to financial regulatory problems were in their country's best interest. Their stated reasons ranged from competitive equity, to efficiency, to simple ethics. Whatever their reasons, however, when they exercised greater control over a policy process (e.g., among the G20, FATF, or Basel), the outcome of that process tended to more closely reflect their preferences. When they exercised less control over a process, like in Congress, the outcome tended to diverge from those preferences. To an outside observer, the result looks haphazard: policies that promise foreign businesses international harmonization and parity with domestic institutions, but which leave those businesses open to unique regulatory scrutiny. Pierce the national veil, however, and it becomes a clearer reflection of the official preferences and politics arrayed underneath.
This account of domestic politics is consistent with another branch of international relations scholarship: bureaucratic network theory. Anne-Marie Slaughter, extending her original thesis on the topic, proposed that bureaucrats operating in similar subject areas routinely cooperate across international borders, either forming policy independently or facilitating closer coordination through existing international institutions. 135 138 have separately written, helps corroborate Slaughter's idea that domestic agencies are critical actors in international law. However, DoddFrank demonstrates how those agencies-and the people who lead them-are also critical agents in domestic politics. If we are not surprised by the initiative, independence, and ability of those agents to act abroad, we should not be surprised when they exhibit the same traits at home. 139 This dynamic should give succor to those concerned about the dearth of democratic accountability in bureaucratic networks. For example, Zaring has argued "the dramatic actions of the Fed during the financial crisis, none of which were subject to notice, comment, or judicial review, revealed just how far the central bank has strayed from the conventional procedures of an APA-mindful domestic agency." 140 However, the outcomes these agencies reach are limited by the process that creates them, in which different actors, with different preferences, hold different amounts of authority at different times. Thus, there are many ways a concerned party could influence the exercise and distribution of that authority-not just at the federal level, (before Congress, agencies, and departments) or the supranational level (in, for example, comment letters to the Basel Committee), but at the state and local level, on issues like the scope and requirements of a state banking charter. The more institutionally diverse the process, the greater the chance domestic actors have to intervene, and the more electoral politics can influence or supersede bureaucratic politics, well before the water's edge.
